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BIGSBY V. JOHNSON. [18b. (2d) 
by the statute to be "every person engaged in the business 
of making sales at retail. ... " (Deering's Gen. Laws 
[1935], .Act 8493, sec. 2 [e].) Under the circumstances of 
the present case, there can be no question but that the sale 
involved was a "sale at retail" within the statute since such 
a sale is defined to be "a sale to a consumer or to any person 
for any purpose other than for resale in the form of tangible 
personal property .... " (Deering's Gen. Laws [1935J, 
.Act 8493, sec. 2 [c].) 
.Admitting that this transaction constitutes a retail sale 
within the tax statute, plaintiff relies upon the argument 
that the sale of the used MonomeIt pot was merely a casual 
and incidental sale to which the retail sales tax was never 
intended to apply. Defendant points out, however, that 
plaintiff held a permit to engage in the business of making 
sales of any kind at retail and that he was clearly a "re-
tailer" within the meaning of the statute, so far as the bulk 
of his business operations was concerned., (Deering's Gen. 
Laws [1935], .Act 8493, sec. 2 [b]; see Revenue and Taxation 
Code, sec. 6006; People ex rel. Walker Engraving Oorp. v. 
Graves, 243 .App. Div. 652 [276 N. Y. Supp. 674] ; aff'd 268 
N. Y. 648 [198N. E. 539J; People ex. reZ. Foremost Studio 
Inc. v. Graves, 246 .App. Div. 130 [284 N. Y. Supp. 906] ; Ou-
sick v. Commonwealth, 260 Ky. 204 [84 S. W. (2d) 14] ; Long 
v. Roberts &- Son, 234 .Ala. 570 [176 So. 213].) Since plain-
tiff can be classified generally as a "retailer," it is urged by 
defendant that any sale at retail by such a person is taxable 
under the statute, whether a sale of the kind ordinarily made 
in the course of his business or not. This is said to follow 
from the fact that section 3, supra, measures the tax which it 
places Upon retailers by gross receipts from the sale "of all 
tangible personal property." (Italics ours.) 
[1] The question arises, therefore, whether the legislature 
intended to include in the measure of the tax the receipts from 
those retail sales of a retailer that are incidental and casual, 
as well as from the retail sales that are made in the ordinary 
course of business. .Although most jurisdictions imposing 
sales taxes specifically exempt casual or isolated sales, a ma-
jority of them hold that the exemption does not include 
casual retail sales made in the Course of business operations 
by one who is engaged in the retail sales business. (Prentice-
Hall, State & Local Tax Service, pars. 92,572, 92,953.) The 
~ 
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tax is imposed upon retailers for the privilege of doing a 
retail sales business (Western Lithograph 00. v. State Board 
of Equalization, 11 Cal. (2d) 156, 164 [78 Pac. (2d) 731, 
117 .A. L. R. 838]), and the measure of the tax is the gross 
receipts of any such retailer from the sale of "all tangible 
personal property sold at retail. ... " (Act 8493, sec. 3.) 
The plaintiff is a retailer. He sold the personal property in 
question at retail as a part of his business operations,and 
the plain language of the act requires the inclusion of the 
gross receipts therefrom in the measure of the tax. He' can 
claim no exemption merely by virtue of the fact that the sale 
of used printing equipment was not the kind of retail sale 
ordinarily made by him. Our statute creates no exemption 
covering the situation, and however' forceful ,may . be plain-
tiff's contention that this type of sale should be exempted 
from the operation of the statute, such arguments must be 
directed to the legislature rather than to the courts. 
Weare not required, under the facts of this case, to decide 
the question raised in the briefs as to the taxability under' 
the statute of gross receipts from casual retail sales that 
have no relation whatever to a retailer's business operations. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., and Carter, J., 
concurred. 
[8. F. No. 16608. In Bank.~Nov. 1, 1941.] 
JOELENE DONNELLY, Respondent, v. SOUTHERN PA-
CIFIC COMPANY -(a Corporation), Appellant. 
[1] Commeree-Regulation-By State.-In the absence of con-
trary congressional legislation a state may by statute or ju-
dicial decision establish rules affecting interstate commerce 
so long as such commerce is not unduly burdened. But a 
statute enacted by Congress which covers the subject of the 
state's regulation supersedes the state statute or decision. 
MeR:. Dig. References: 1,2,4. Commerce, § 3; 3. Carriers, § 88; 
5. Negligence, § 3; 6. Negligence, § 8; 7,8. Negligence, § 7; 9,10. 
Carriers, § 74. 
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[2] Id.-Regulation-By State-Effect of Federal Act Embracing 
General Field.-A statute enacted by Congr<'ss that embraces 
the general field but does not cover the matter on which the 
state has ruled supersedes the state's statute or decision 
affecting interstate commerce only if Congress intended by 
such legislation to occupy the entire field, thereby excluding 
all state control. In such case, the state courts are then 
bound by the federal decisional law in the field. 
[Sa,3b] Carriers-Carriage of Passengers-Personal Injuries-
Gratuitous Transportation-Hepburn Act.-The Hepburn Act 
(34 U. S. Stats. at Large, p. 544; 49 U. S. C. A. § 1) was in-
tended to occupy the entire field of free passes. It supersedes 
all state law in the field and the decisions of the federal courts 
are, therefore, controlling on 'the liability of a carrier for 
negligence to the holder of a pass containing an exculpatory 
provision. . 
[4] Commerce-Regulation-Federal Act as Superseding State 
Rule.-Generally an act of Congress is not regarded as super-
seding a state' statute or decision unless the two conflict or 




Negligence-Definition.-N egligence is an unintentional tort, 
a failure to exercise the degree of care in a given situation 
that a reasonable man under similar circumstances would 
exercise to protect others from harm. 
Id.-"Wilfulness"-Wanton Misconduct.-A negligent person 
must be distinguished from a person guilty of wilful mis-
conduct. A tort occurring when a person with no intent to 
cause harm intentionally performs an act so unreasonable 
and dangerous that he knows, or should know,that it is 
highly probable that harm will result, is most accurately 
designated as wanton and reckless misconduct. Such miscon-
duct is more closely akin to wilful misconduct than to negli-
gence, and it has most of the legal consequences of wilful 
misconduct. . Such misconduct is characterized by the federai 
courts as "wilful and wanton negligence." 
Id.-Degrees of Negligence-Rule in the Federal Courts. 
The federal courts recognize no degrees of negligence. While 
there may be different standards of care in different circum-
stances, the failure to exercise' such care in each case con-
stitutes no more than negligence. 
.[8] Id.-DegrE)es ofNegligence~Itule in California.-While Cali~ 
. fornia courts distinguish between ordinary and gross negli-
gence, this' distinction amounts to a rule of policy that a 
faihire . to exercise due care in those situations where the 
Nov. 1941.] DONNELLY V. SOUTHERN PACIFIC CO. 
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risk of harm is great will give rise to legal consequences 
harsher than those arising from negligence in less hazardous 
situations. 
[9] Carriers-Carriage of Passengers-Tickets and Fares-Limi-
tation of Liability for Negligence.-The federal courts recog-
nize the validity of a release of a carrier from liability for 
negligence, including what in California would constitute 
gross negligence, and hold such a release inapplicable only 
in case of wanton and reckless misconduct as distinguished 
from negligence. 
[10] Id.-Carriage of Passengers-Tickets and Fares-Limitation 
of Liability for Negligence-Injury from Act of Switchman. 
Under the rule obtaining in the federal courts, a provision 
in a pass releasing a carrier from liability for injury to the 
person using it exempts the carrier from liability for injuries 
sustained in a collision resulting from the act of a switchman 
in throwing a' switch the wrong way where it does not, ap ... 
pear that he intended so to throw it or that he knew that 
he was throwing it the wrong way, in other words, where 
he was not guilty of reckless and wanton misconduct. 
,APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Ala-
.(' meda County. S. Victor Wagler, Judge. Reversed. 
Action for damages for personal injuries sustained in a 
railroad collision by a person traveling on a free pass. Judg;. 
ment for plaintiff reversed. 
Elliott Johnson for Appellant. 
Hildebrand & Bills and James R. Agee for Respondent~ 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff, the wife of ,an employee ·of the 
Southern Pacific Railroad, was traveling on a free pass from 
.El Paso, Texas, to Sacramento, California, aboard a Southern 
Pacific train when it collided with an eastbound train stand-
ing upon a siding in California. Pl~intiff brought this action 
against the railroad to recover damages for personal injurieS 
suffered in the collision. The complaint alleges, and, the 
,answer admits, that before the collision one of defendant '8 
employees, in the course of his employment, set improperly 
the switch that controlled the siding, causing the westbound 
. 10. See 4 Cal. Jur. 920; 10 Am. Jur. 115. 
180. (2d)-28 
.. 
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train to turn into the siding and collide with the eastbound 
train. No evidence was introduced on the question of negli-
gence. The court instructed the jury that the plaintiff was 
entitled to recover from the d.efendant only if the switchman 
was grossly negligent in, setting the ~witch. It defined gross 
negligence as "that entire want of care which would raise a 
presumption of conscious indifference to consequences; an 
entire want of care, or such a slight degree of care as to 
justify the belief that there was an entire disregard for and 
indifference to the safety and welfare of others." The jury 
returned a, verdict in favor of the plaintiff, and defendant 
has appealed from the judgment. 
The free pass on which plaintiff was traveling contained 
the following condition: "The person accepting and using 
this pass, in consideration of using the same, agrees that the 
Southern Pacific Company shall not be liable under any cir-
cumstances for any injury to the person, or for any loss or 
damage to the property of the individual using the pass; 
and that as to such person the Company shall not be con-
sidered as a common carrier or liable as such." Plaintiff 
contends that this provision releases the defendant from 
liability for ordinary negligence, but not gross negligence, 
and that the jury was justified in finding the switchman 
guilty of gross negligence. Defendant asserts that the pro-
vision is a release from liability for any sort of negligence, 
ordinary or gross; that the provision is inapplicable only in 
the case of wilful or wanton misconduct, and that there is no 
evidence to justify a finding that the switchman was guilty 
of wilful or wanton misconduct. 
California by statute has provided that" a common carrier 
cannot be exonerated, by any agreement made in anticipation 
thereof, from liability for the gross negligence, fraud or 
willful wrong of himself or his servants." (Civil Code, 
sec. 2175.) rrhis court has held that the improper setting of 
an open switch may constitute gross negligence rendering the 
railroad liable to a passenger traveling on a free pass who 
is irijured in the resulting 'accident. (Walther v. Southern 
,Pacific 00., 159 Cal. 769 [116 Pac. 51, 37 L. R . .A'.. (N. S.) 
235] .) 
[1] Plaintiff, however, was traveling in interstate com-
'merce. The question presented therefore is whether the 
California statute and decision can validly apply to rail-
Nov. 1941.] DONNELLY v. SOUTHERN PACIFIO.,CO. 
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roads engaged in interstate commerce. In,the';'absence')of 
contrary congressional legislation a state may ;by statute or 
judicial decision establish rules affecting intersta.te ·commer~e 
so long as such commerce is not unduly burdened.i(Port 
Richmond etc. Ferry 00. v. Freehaldersof Hudson Dounty, 
234 U. S. 317 [34 Sup. Ct. 821, 58 L. Ed. 1330] ; Geer:v. 
Oonnecticut, 161 U. S. 519 [16 Sup~ Ct. 600;40 n. Ed~ 793]'; 
Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U. S. 461[15 SUp!: Ct., 154, 
39 'L. Ed~ 223] ; Oooley v. Board of Port 'Wardens, 12 H'ow. 
299 [13 L. Ed. 996] ; Ohicago, R. I. &- P. Ry. Co.v. Maucher, 
248 U. S. 359 [39 Sup. Ct. 1.08, 63 L. Ed. :294] ; !Ohicago M. 
& St. P. Ry. 00. v. Solan, 169 U. S. 133 '[18 Sup.Ct.'289,.42 
L. Ed. 688] ; Pennsylvania R. R. 00. v. Hughes, 191 U.S. 477 
[24 Sup. Ct. 132, 48 L. Ed. 268].) If a statut'e'is enacted 
by Congress covering the subject of the state's'regnlati6n; it 
supersedes the state statute or decision. '(Southe'rn Ry. 00. 
v. Railroad Oommission of IndiaM, 236 U. ·S~ 439', [35 Sup. 
Ct. 304, 59 L. Ed. 661] ; Southern Express Do. v; Byers, 24.0 
U. S. 612 [36 Sup. Ct. 410, 60 L~ Ed. 825] {Adams Express 
00. v. Oroninger, 226 U. S. 491 [33 Sup. Ot:: 148, ,57 L.Ed. 
314]; Western Union Tel. 00. v. Speight,: 254' U~' S. 17 [41 
__ Sup. Ct. 11, 65 L. Ed. 104]. See Western Union Tel. 00. v. 
, Oommercial M~1ling 00., 218 U. S. 406 [31 Sup. Ct. 59, 54 
L. Ed. 1088]. See 30 Ill. L. Rev. 373; 41 Harv. L. Rev. 200.) 
[2] 'If, however, Congress enacts a statute that embraces 
the general field but does not cover the matter on which the 
state has ruled, the state statute or decision is superseded 
only if Congress intended by such legislation to occupy the 
entire field, thereby excluding all state control. (Atchison, 
T. & S. F. Ry. 00. v. Railroad Oom. of Gal., 283 U. 8.'380 '[51 
Sup. Ct. 553, 75 L. Ed. 1128]; Kelly v. Washington, 302 
U. S. 1 [58 Sup. Ct. 87, 82 L. Ed. 3] ; H.P."W'elch Oo.::~. 
New Hampshire, 306 U. S. 79 [59 Sup. Ct. 438; S3L., Ed. 
500] ; Kansas Oity So. Ry. 00. v. Van Zant, 260 !U~ S. 459 
[43 Sup. Ct. 176, 67 L. Ed. 348] ; Southern Express Co.v. 
Byers, supra; Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, supra; West-
ern Union Tel. 00. v. Speight, supra; Postal Tel.-Oable 00. 
v. Warren-Godwin Lumber 00., 251 U. S. 27 [40 Sup. Ct. 69, 
64 L. Ed. 118] ; see Ohicago M. & St. P. Ry. 00. v. Solan, 
supra; Ohicago R. 1. & P. Ry. Co. v. Maucher, supra; Penn-
sylvania R. R. 00. v. Hughes, supra.) The state courts are 
then bound by federal decisional law':in the field. (Kansas 
868 '''DONNELLY v. SOUTHERN PACIFIC CO. [18 C.(2d) 
City So. Ry. Co. v. Van Zant, supra; Southern Express Co. 
v. Byers, supra; Adams Express 00. v. Oroninger, supra; 
Western Union Tel. 00. v. Speight, supra.) 
[3a] In 1906 Congress passed the Hepburn Act (34 U. S. 
Stats. at Large, 544 [49 U. S. C. A., § 1]) regulating the 
issuance of free passes by interstate car"riers. The act deals 
only with the classes of persons to whom free passes may be 
issued and contains nothing about the liability of carriers· to 
such passengers, nor the terms of the passes. [4] Gen-
erally an act of Congress is not regarded as superseding a 
state statute or decision unless the two conflict or the state 
law stands in the way of congressional objectives. (R. P. 
Welch 00. v. New Hampshire, supra; Kelly v.Washington, 
supra; Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Railroad Oom. of Cal., 
s'u,pra; Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U. S. 598 [60 Sup. Ct. 726, 
84 L. Ed. 969] ; Palmer V. Massachusetts, 308 U: S. 79 [60 Sup. 
Ct. 34, 84 L. Ed. 931.) [3b] Nothing in the Hepburn Act 
conflicts with state rules on liability for negligence, and it sets 
forth no objective that would be hindered by the application 
of. state law. Nevertheless the Supreme Court of the United 
States took the position in Kansas Oity Southern Ry. 00. V. 
Van Zant, supra, that the Hepburn Act was intended to 
occupy the entire field of free passes, that it superseded all 
state law in the field, and that the decisions of the federal 
courts were therefore controlling on the liability of a carrier 
for negligence to a holder of a pass containing an exculpatory 
provision. This court is bound by that decision and must 
therefore disregard the California law and .apply the rules 
established by the decisions of the federal courts. 
The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that 
a carrier may validly contract to release itself from lia-
bility for negligence to the holder of a free pass. (Northern 
Pacific Ry. CO. V. Adams, 192 U. S. 440 [24 Sup. Ct., 408, 
48 L. Ed. 513]; Boering v. OhesapBake Beach R. 00., 193 
U. S. 442 [24 Sup. Ct. 515, 48 L. Ed. 742]; Oharleston & 
Western Oarolina Ry. Co. v. Thompson, 234 U. S. 576 [34 
Sup. Ct. 964, 58 L. Ed. 1476]; Kansas City Southern Ry. 
Co. v. Van Zant, supra; see Smith V. Atchison, T. &- S. F. Ry. 
00. (C. C. A. 8), 194 Fed. 79 [114 C. C. A. 157] ; Ellis v. Davis 
(C. C. A. 5) ~ 4 Fed. (2d) ·323.) The federal courts have 
indicated, however, that a carrier may not 'protect itself from 
liability for "willful and wanton negligence." (New York 
~ 
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Oentral R. R. Co. v. 1J10hney, 252 U. S. 152 [40 Sup. Ct. 287; 
64 L. Ed. 502]; Virginia Beach Bus Line v. Oampbell 
(C. C. A. 4), 73 Fed. (2d) 97, cert. den. 294 U. S. 727 [55 
Sup. Ct. 637, 79 L. Ed. 1258] ; see Northern Pac. Ry. 00. v. 
Adams, supra; Bush v. Bremner, 36 Fed. (2d) 189; Smith 
v. Atchison, T. &- S. F. Ry. 00., supra.) It is therefore neces .. 
sary to determine what is meant by "willful and wanton 
negligence. " 
[5] Negligence is an unintentional tort, a failure to exer-
cise the degree of care in a given situation that a reasonable 
man under similar circumstances would exercise to protect 
others from harm. (Rest. Torts, secs. 282, 283, 284; Prosser, 
Torts, secs. 30 et seq.) [6] A negligent person has no 
desire to cause the harm that results from his carelessness, 
(Rest. Torts, sec. 282 (c», and he must be distinguished from 
a, person guilty of willful misconduct, such as assault and 
battery, who intends to cause harm. (Prosser, Torts, p. 
261.) Willfulness and negligence are contradictory terms. 
(Kelly v. Malott, 135 Fed. 74 [67 C. C. A. 548]; Neary V~ 
Northern Pac. R. Co., 41 Mont. 480 [110 Pac. 226] ; Michels 
v; Boruta, (Tex. Civ. App.) 122 S. W. (2d) 216.) If con-
duct is negligent, it is not willful; if it is willful, it is not 
negligent. It is frequently difficult, however, to characterize 
conduct as willful or negligent. A tort having some of the 
characteristics of hoth negligence and willfulness occurs 
when a person with no intent to cause harm intentionally 
performs an act so unreasonable and dangerous that he 
knows, or should know, it is highly probable that harm will 
result. (Rest. Torts, sec. 500 et seq.; Prosser, 'Torts, pp~: 
260, 261.) Such a tort has: been Libeled "willful 'negli-
gence, ' , , , wanton and willful negligence,"; :',' wa.nton ··i:ind; 
willful misconduct, " and even" gross rieglig~nc'e)";" It is 'Jh6si 
accurately' designated as wanton and ·reckless~-mi~conduct.; 
It involves 110· intention, as does willful misconduct, tod()\ 
harm, and it differs from negligence in that it does involve;-
an intention to perform an act that the actorkn(jws, or should\; 
know, will very probably causeh3J.'m. (See Kastel v. Stieber," 
215 'Cal. 37, 46 [8 Pac. (2d) 474]; Albersv. '8h~lZ·Oo.!ol 
Calif., 104 Cal. App. 733 [286 Pac. 752'1 ; Tognazz'iniv. Free-
man, 18 Cal. App: 468 [123 Pac. 540] ; 45 C. 'J.674~} , Wan-' 
ton and reckless misconduct is more closely akin to willful 
misconduct than • to negligence, and it has most of the legal 
870 DONNELLY V. SOUTHERN PACIFIC CO. [18 C. (2d) 
consequences of willful misconduct. 'Thus, it justifies an 
award of punitive damages, and contributory negligence by 
the plaintiff is not a defense. (See cases cited in Prosser, 
Torts, p. 261.) 
This is the type of misconduct that the federal courts 
characterize as "willful and wanton negligence." In New 
York Oentral R. R. 00. v. Mohney, supra, an engineer ran 
his train past two separate danger signals and it crashed 
into a train ahead. The collision resulted in injury to plain-
tiff, who was traveling on a free pass containing. a provision 
releasing the railroad from liability for negligence. The 
State Court of Appeals found the engineer guilty of willful 
and wanton negligence, and the United States Supreme Court 
held the railroad liable, despite the release in the pass, on 
the ground that there was sufficient evidence to support the 
state court's finding of willful and wanton negligence. A 
railroad engineer who has deliberately run his train past 
two .danger signals has intentionally performed so dangerous 
an act that he must have known that harm would probably 
result, and he is guilty of wanton and reckless misconduct 
rather than negligence. In Virginia Beach Bus Line' v. 
Oampbell, 73 Fed. (2d) 97, plaintiff, a holder of a free pass 
with a release provision, was injured by' a collision, at a 
dangerous crossing between the bus in which he was riding 
and a railroad train. The court permitted him to recover 
against the defendant bus company on the ground that the 
negligence of the driver in operating the bus at a rate of 
from 55 to 60 miles per hour over a dangerous railroad cross-
ing was willful and wanton. Such. conduct constitutes more 
than negligence. It is a dangerous act performed inten-
tionally with the knowledge that it will probably cause harm. 
[7] Plaintiff contends that while the release is effective 
as to ordinary negligence, it is not effective as to gross negli-
gence. The federal courts, however, have rejected any dis-
tinction between negligence and gross negligence; they recog-
nize no degrees of negligence. (N ew York Oentral Ra1,'lroad 
00. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357 [21 L. Ed. 627]; Steamboat 
New World v. King, 16 How. 469 [14 L. Ed. 1019]; Mil-
waukee db St. PaulRy. Go. v. Arms, 91 U. S. 489, 494' [23 L. 
Ed. 374] ; Westre v. OhicagoM. db St. Paul Ry. 00., 2 Fed. 
(2d) 227, and cases there cited.) If a person fails to exercise 
the degree of care that the law requires him to exercise under 
Nov. 1941.] DONNELLY V. SOUTHERN PACIFIC CO. 
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the circumstances, he is negligent. There may be different 
standards of care in different circumstances but the failure to 
exercise such care in each case constitutes no more than negli-
gence. (See Salmond, Torts (8th ed.), 461; Pollock, Torts 
(13thed.), 457; Prosser, Torts, 256 et seq.; 1 Bevan, Negli~ 
gence (4th ed.), 15; Harper, Law of T6rts,1~6fl Street~ 
Foundations of Legal Liability, 9'9; Elliott, Degrees'of Negli~ 
gence, 6 So: Cal. L. Rev. 91.) Persons deali~gwith ,dang~rous 
instrumentalities involving great risk of harm 'must' ~xercis~ 
a greater amount of care than, persons acting . in, less' ~e~ 
sponsible capacities, but the former,' are"no 'm:o~~,·riegiigeri.t 
than the latter for failing to exercise the required" ca'r~'. 
(See cases cited in 45 C. J. 665, footn'ote,78:r,~ccThere'iare 
no 'degrees' of care, as a matter of law; th~re:'a~~ 'only :ciif~ 
ferentamounts of care, as a matter of fact (Ei:hd 'iross' 
negligence is the same thing as ordinary negli¢ence", 'with 
the addition', as Baron Rolfe put it, 'of' 'a;, v{ttiperati~e 
epithet '. Wilson v. Brett (1843), 11M. & W. 113, 116; 152 
Eng. Rep. 737." (Prosser, Torts, pp. 258,259.), As stated 
by the United States Supreme Court in the!Jockwood case, 
supra: "We have already adverted to the tendency of judicial 
~ opinion adverse to the distinction between gross and ordinary 
, negligence.... In each case, the negligence, whatever 
epithet we give it, is failure to bestow the care and skill which 
the situation demands, and hence it is more strictly accurate 
perhaps to call it simply 'negligence'." 
[8] Some jurisdictions, including California,' distinguish 
between ordinary and gross negligence., (Kastel 'v. Stieber, 
215 Cal. 37 [8 Pac. (2d) 474]; Albers v .. Shell Go. of Galif., 
104 Cal. App. 733 [286 Pac. 752] ; Walther v. Southern Pa-
cific 00., 159 Cal. 769 [116 Pac. 51, 37 L. R. A. (N. :S. )235] ; 
see 6 So. Cal. L. Rev. 91, 127.) This distinction amounts to 
a rule of policy that a failure to exercise due care in those 
situations where the risk of harm is great will give rise to 
legal consequences harsher than those arising from negligence 
in less hazardous situations. (See Walther v. Southern Pa-
cific 00., supra.) [9] The federal rule, however, clearly 
recognizes the validity of a release from liability for negli-
gence, including what in California would constitute' gross 
negligence, and holds such a release inapplicable onlyin the 
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[10] In the present case the alleged conduct of the switch-
man does not constitute wanton and reckless misconduct'. 
There is no allegation that he intended to throw the switch 
,the wrong way. Apparently, he did not know he was throw-
ing the switch the wrong way and that harm would probably 
result. He was guilty of negligence alone. This negligence 
may have been "gross" under the California rule, but th~ 
federal cases are clear that such dereliction constitutes negl!: .. 
gence and not wanton and reckless misconduct. "It would 
be going a great way to say that the failure of the switch 
tender to throw the switch so that the train wouid go on 
the main line was a wanton and malicious neglect. The only 
thing that can be said is that some one was careless, and 
that is admitted .. " (Shelton v. Oanadian Northern Ry .. Oo~, 
189 Fed .. 153, 160; see Mt'lwaukee & St. Paul Ry .. 00. v. Arms, 
supra .. ) There is therefore no basis for a finding of reckless 
and wanton misconduct. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Edmonds, J., concurred. 
[8 .. F. No. 16414. In Bank.-Nov. 1, 1941.J 
THE PEOPLE, Appellant, v. EDDIE LIM, Respondent. 
[1] Nuisances-Power of Legislature-Authority of Courts.-The 
legislature, within the constitutional limits of its powers, 
may declare any act criminal and make the repetition or con-
tinuance thereof a public nuisance, and it may vest in courts 
of equity the power to abate it by injunction. But it is not 
the province of the courts to ordain such jurisdiction for 
themselves. 
1. Constitutionality of statute conferring on chancery courts 
power to abate public nuisances, notes, 5 A. L. R. 1474; 22 A. L. R. 
542; 75 A. L. R. 1298. See, also, 14 Cal. Jur. 242; 28 Am. Jur. 
338. 
McK. Dig. References: 1, 2. Nuisances, § 3; 3. Nuisances, § 35 ; 
4, 6. Gaming, § 4; 5. Nuisances, § 49; 7. Pleading. § 90 (3). 
,,': 
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[2] Id.-Power of Legislature-Policy as to NecessitY for Legis~ 
lative DeCIa,ration.-HN uisance" is a term which does not 
:have a fixed content either at common law or at the present 
time and, therefore, reasons of policy require that the re-
sponsibilityfor establishing those standards of public moral-
ity, the: violations of which are to constitute public nuisances 
within equity's jurisdiction, should be left with the legislature. 
[3] Id. - Equitable Relief - Where Nuisance is Also a Crime-
Legislative Declaration-Necessity for.-While equity will not 
withhold the remedy of injunctive relief merely because the 
acts constituting a nuisance are also of a criminal nature, 
:', 'it is loath to interfere where the standards of public policy 
can be enforced by resort to the criminal law; and in, the 
absence of a legislative declaration to that effect, the courts 
should not' broaden the field in which injunctions against 
criminal activity will be granted. 
[4] Gallling--:-Abatement as Nuisance-Gambling Establishment. 
The basis for an action, to restrain the continuance of the 
operation of a gambling establishment must be found in the 
statutes, rather than by reference to the common law defi-
nitions of public nuisance .. 
[5] Nuisances -.:... Remedies - Pleading - Allegations of Facts.-
Where an attempt is made to enjoin particular activity upon 
the theory that it constitutes a nuisance under general statu-
tory provisions, sufficient facts must be alleged so that the 
court may conclude that a nuisance exists within the provi-
sions of the statute. Where the legislature has specified the 
particular activity which is sought to be enjoined, a general 
allegation cannot mislead the defendant as to the nature of 
the, case which he is called upon to. answer. , 
[6] Gaming - Abatement as Nuisance --.: Pleading. - A complaint 
to restra,in the continuing of the operation of a gambling 
establishment is good as against a general demurrer where it 
alleges that the gambling house draws together great numbers 
of disorderly persons, disturbs the public peace, brings to-
gether idle persons, cultivates dissolute habits among them, 
creates traffic arid fire hazards, and is thereby injurious to 
health, indecent and offensive to the senses and impairs the 
free enjoyment of life and property . 
. [7] Pleading - Demurrer to Complaint - Grounds - Uncertainty. 
A special demurrer toa complaint should not be sustained 
3. . Jurisdiction to enjoin an act amounting to a crime, notes, 
40 A. L.R., 1145; 91 A .. L. R. 315. See, also, 14 Cal. Jur. 21i; 
28 Am. Jur. 336. 
.,. 7. See 21 Cal. Jut. 102~ 104; 21 R. C. L. 526. 
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